Fiasco at Saint Lo, France | D-Day June 6, 1944
 

Fiasco at Saint-Lo, France by Harry C. Evans, Group Bombardier, 322nd Bombardment Group September 6, 1943 to July 31, 1944.

The 322nd Bomb Group (M) Army Air Corps, using the B-26 Martin Marauder Medium Bomber, had given our invasion forces very close air support since D-Day. A famed London newspaperman wrote the following:

Never before in the history of warfare have ground troops received such close support from aircraft other than fighters and fighter bombers as they have from the medium bombers, B-26 Marauders, of the U. S. Ninth Air Force on the beaches of Normandy.

During the months of June and July 1944 a considerable part of our activities was in support of the British and Canadian troops landing on Sword and Gold Beaches. After the British had secured their landing beach area and proceeded to move inland, our Bomber Group, along with other B-26 Groups, were called on many times to bomb the German troops facing the British and defending the area just north of Caen, France.

In terms of bombing accuracy our support of the British and Canadians was always good or excellent. As Group Bombardier of the 322nd Bomb Group it was my job to write a report of the results of each mission for our Bomber Command; therefore, I reviewed and discussed the photographs of the bomb strikers with our expert photograph interpreters. These experts would advise me of where the bombs had been dropped and what damages had been inflicted. Based on this firsthand information and my knowledge of our Group's history of bombing, I can safely say that we never dropped a single bomb short of our target area on either the British or Canadians.

In connection with the above statement, I wish to point out that we (the air crew members of our Group) were disappointed with General Bernard, the British commander. We thought he was sitting on his duff rather than taking reasonable offensive action to capture Caen. It was rumored in our Group that Montgomery was quoted as saying. "pip, pip, old boy, we shall attack with our tanks tomorrow, if it doesn't rain."

While the British were marking time north of Caen, our soldiers were slugging it out but making good progress in the Omaha Beach area and on Cherbourg Peninsula. We did some very effective work during these two months in support of our own troops at Utah and Omaha Beaches. Our air crews, especially the bombardiers, realized every time we were called on to help with direct support that our troops fighting the war on the ground needed our best effort.

On July 25, 1944, we were ordered to participate in a massive attack on the German defensive line located in the area southwest of Saint-Lo, France, where the Germans had a concentration of antitank guns and light artillery, along with a very large number of troops and tanks. These troops were dug in along the south side of the main road running west of Saint-Lo to Periers, France. The German defense had stopped our troops in this area, and because the British were not moving in their sector, something had to be done quickly.

This attack was so important to the Allies that it required the maximum effort of both our Eighth and Ninth Air Forces as well as that of the British Royal Air Force. The attack involved air B-17 and B-24 Heavy Bombers, all our B-26 Marauders, and all our fighters, the P-38, P-47, and P-51 Groups. The British Royal Air Force furnished their heavy bombers and fighters. More than five thousand aircraft participated in this operation. At the time it was the largest air strike ever ordered.

Our Group's Field Orders required us to bomb an area beginning 100 feet south of the Saint-Lo-to-Periers road. Our orders required that we furnish 36 aircraft for this mission. (In the end, only 35 aircraft attacked the target because one ship failed to drop bombs due to a bomb rack malfunction.) We flew our normal 18-ship box formations, consisting of three flights of six planes each per box: a lead flight, a high flight, and a low flight. The bombing altitude was set at 10,500 feet for the lead box and 10,000 feet for the second box. Each plane was loaded with sixteen 260-pound antipersonnel fragmentation bombs.

These were the largest and most powerful antipersonnel bombs that our Group had ever carried. The bomb itself looked angry, with its casing of 3/4 inch-wide steel washers just waiting to explode. The intervals or spacing between the bombs was set at 50 feet. We used a special pressure-proximity fuse to achieve air bursts designed to penetrate trench and hedge row positions occupied by the enemy. Our bomb tacticians devised this fusing to allow the first bomb to hit the ground so that its explosion would set off a second bomb a few feet above the ground, which in turn set off a third bomb in the air. The fourth bomb would explode on the ground, starting the sequence over again.

Our standard bombing procedure was used on this mission to Saint-Lo, that is, the lead bombardier of the lead flight of each box sighted for all aircraft in his 18-ship box and every ship in the box dropped its bombs when the lead ship dropped its bombs. This meant that all 288 bombs would be free falling about the same time creating more concussion and havoc on detonation.

The lead pilot for the first box was the 449th Squadron Commander. The lead bombardier was his Squadron Bombardier. A First Lieutenant was the lead bombardier of the second box. I conducted the bombing segment of the mission briefing, furnishing the crews with the pertinent information regarding the mission. Other meteorological data was used to determine the approximate dropping angle to be preset in the Norden Bombsight. I very strongly emphasized fact that our troops were only a few hundred feet north of the aiming point. Accordingly, I stressed that whatever they did; they were not to drop short: on this mission it was better to be one hundred miles over target rather than one hundred feet short.

After the mission and all planes had returned to base (only three planes received minor flak damage) I gathered the mission photographs and the photo experts to prepare my report. The photographs of the bombed area indicated that a disastrous mistake had been made. The photo interpreters and I, working with maps of the area, determined that our own troops had been bombed. The photos revealed that our tanks, which had been painted white the day before, had received direct hits, and there was photographic evidence that many troops appeared to have been killed or wounded. Something terrible had gone wrong. For same reason the first box had dropped 3,000-5,000 feet short of the aiming point; the second box was short as well.

I questioned both lead bombardiers. Neither reported any difficulty in finding the IP (Initial Point, an easily identifiable landmark that we fly over to begin or prepare to begin the actual bombing run). Neither man complained about the visibility or any other adverse weather condition. I requested that the Group Armament Officer check the lead planes for any malfunction that could have caused an early release of the bombs; he found nothing wrong with the bomb racks. The Bombsight Officer checked the Norden bombsights and found them to be in proper working order. Both bombardiers stated that they had not used the telescope's extended vision to view the target area; therefore, it could not have caused the error.

As far as I could determine, the mistake was not due to mechanical malfunction. But what had caused the fatal mistake? During the mission interrogation several experienced bombardiers and navigators told me they had not recognized the area bombed as the target area. It became evident that even though the lead bombardiers thought they had hit the target area, they did not know exactly where they were when their bombs were released.

In regard to this conclusion, I would like to add the following: Before the mission I had suspected that the squadron bombardier was too weary and nervous to lead a mission against this type of target, because this target required accurate navigation and precision bombing. I simply didn't believe he could do it. I talked with his squadron commander requesting that he use another experienced bombardier who was very steady on bombing runs. I also explained that for the past few months his squadron bombardier would come by my office after every mission he flew to complain that he could not control his bowels or kidneys during a mission. I advised him to see his squadron Doctor, but he felt that as squadron bombardier, he should not be grounded. He said that he realized he was extremely nervous and sometimes nauseated, especially immediately before the bomb run. I also told him that he had served well for more than 60 missions and had done his part and it was time for him to step aside and let someone else take over. The squadron commander listened to me, but he refused to think about anybody else as his lead bombardier. I thought that he was rather hardheaded and arbitrary in this matter; however, he was the leader in charge of this mission. I think I did my duty by advising him that his bombardier had some problems. I'm sure he regrets not changing the lead bombardier. It seems to me that some pilots thought that bombardiers were just along for the ride and they had trouble believing bombardiers had any special problems. In this connection, I would like to explain the position of our lead bombardiers and the burden on them.

Because of our bombing procedures our lead bombardiers were under constant stress and pressure. The success or failure of the mission depended entirely on them. More bombardiers were injured in combat than any other crew member. Bombardiers could see the flashing flak guns on the ground firing at the formation. When he knew the flak was on the way up, he hoped he could turn the formation the right way to avoid it. In addition, enemy fighters and adverse weather conditions added to the bombardiers problems. Each lead bombardier was usually selected by the squadron commander of the lead squadron. Of course, the lead bombardier expected to hit the target and everyone else involved in the mission expected him to be successful. When he hit the target, it was great, he was doing his job. If he missed, he was just another poorly prepared flunky. Other crew members, of course, had their particular problems. We were all in the same ship, but the bombardier, surrounded almost completely by plexi-glass, could see more than the others. I believe you can understand why the lead bombardier flew with anxiety, mental stress, and apprehension on every mission.

As the largest Air Force operation to date, Saint-Lo attracted many high-ranking Air Force Officers and others as observers and evaluators. Our Group Commander, Colonel Glen C. Nye, was there. After returning to our base he told me that he had had to take his wings off his Eisenhower jacket so that no one would know that he was an Air Force officer. He said, "The soldiers were mad enough at the Air Force to shoot them."

Ernie Pyle, the famous war correspondent, was in the Saint-Lo area at the time of the bombing and stated that he watched in horror as Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair and other Americans were killed by off-target bombs from our own planes. The Army newspaper Stars and Stripes on July 15, 1944, reported that on July 14, 1944, Lieutenant General Hen Lean had been assigned command of the Array Ground Forces, relieving Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, who had been given an important overseas assignment (the nature of which was not disclosed). In fact, McNair had been killed by our bombs, as had an Associated Press photographer, Brett, who died taking pictures of the bombing.

Ironically, despite this tragedy the major thrust of the massive air attack was an overwhelming success. We were advised that the German troops who survived the bombing were so raddled and disoriented that they could not fire their rifles. Our troops immediately broke through the German lines and encircled thousands of enemy soldiers, who surrendered shortly after the breakthrough. General George Patton's tanks also broke-through the lines and headed toward Paris.

The day after the Saint-Lo mission I was ordered to report to Major General Samuel E. Anderson, commander of the B-26 Forces in Europe. I was to explain to him what had happened to cause our Group to drop short of the target, bombing our own troops. As Group Bombardier, I knew I would be called on the carpet. I was considered responsible for the Group's bombing efficiency -- or the lack of it.

I was already terribly shaken up by our bombing of our troops, and the idea of being questioned by Major General Anderson and his staff increased my apprehension and nervousness. Only God knows how many were killed and injured. Before going to the meeting I checked out everything that I could think of that they might ask about. I knew that I would tell the truth to the best of my knowledge and belief. I told the General and his Staff generally what is stated above and that I had concluded that both lead bombardiers had mistakenly identified the target area and aiming point.

I knew that my job as Group Bombardier was coming to an end. This was a major and tragic error that required changes in leadership. I had been the Group Bombardier since September 1943 and had flown 51 combat missions, leading 46 of them. I'm proud to say that I never last a single aircraft in our box. In August 1944 I was replaced by Major Walter Snyder of Boston, Massachusetts, and I was returned to the United States by the Ninth Air Force Medical Board.

To the best of my knowledge no historian has published any work covering this incident. Nor have I seen any official remarks, other than an admission that there had been a serious bombing error, which was passed off as a calculated risk that had to be taken under the circumstances.

Since I have firsthand knowledge of same of the basic facts involved in our part of the operation, I believe an explanation of these facts and circumstances should be recorded to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signed:
Harry Evens